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STUDENT NOTE
EVIDENCE-THE OPINION RULE AS APPLICABLE TO DYING DECLA-
RATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA-ANoTHER VIEw.-The extra-judicial
assertions of a deceased person made under the belief of impending
death-though hearsay-are admissible in evidence at the trial of
a person charged with the homicide of the declarant to prove the
circumstances surrounding the death., The problem discussed
in this note is whether such declarations must also satisfy the
requirement that testimonial evidence must be based on facts
rather than opinion, that is, does the opinion rule apply to these
declarations?
Before attempting to progress towards the solution of this
problem (if a solution exists), the few West Virginia cases that
tend to cast some light on this rather obscure point must be con-
sidered. A brief statement of each case will be offered before
any critical analysis is attempted. In State v. Burnett2 a dying
declaration was discussed. The court stated that the declaration
was inadmissible because it contained mere declarations of opinion
and would have been inadmissible if the declarant had been so
1 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1431-1434 (3d ed. 1940).
2 47 W. Va. 731, 35 S.E. 983 (1900).
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testifying on the stand. The syllabus pertaining to this point
reads as follows: "Dying declarations, being a substitute for
sworn testimony, must be such narrative statements as would be
admissible had the dying person been sworn as a witness. If they
relate to facts to which the declarant could have thus testified,
they are admissible. Mere declarations of opinion, which would
not be received if the declarant were a witness, are inadmissible."3
If this syllabus sets forth the law of the case4 and has never been
overruled, this would seem to settle the problem and, irrespective
of the desirability of such result, the law in West Virginia would
be that the opinion rule does apply to dying declarations. How-
ever, before discussing the dying declaration the court in this
case had found that the trial was conducted before a special judge
who had no jurisdiction, such decision calling for reversal
without necessity of a further search for error. The statement as
to dying declarations was unnecessary to the decision of the case
and seemingly a dictum.5 The court expressly stated that it
was discussing this point only for the guidance of the trial court
when the evidence was submitted upon a new trial.
In State v. HoodO it was contended that the dying declaration
was inadmissible on two grounds. One was that within the dying
declartion the declarant set forth an extra-judicial statement of
a third person. The court held that this part was inadmissible,
because hearsay, and went on to say, "A dying declaration must
be such as would be admissible if the party were living and giving
evidence [citing the Burnett case] .... Therefore hearsay cannot
be rendered admissible by being included in a dying declaration."7
The court thus at least approved of the statement in the Burnett
case, if it did not adopt it as a holding. The other ground of
objection was that it was not shown that the declarant believed in
3 Point 2 of the syllabus by the court. Italics supplied.
4 See Hardman, "The Law"--In West Virginia, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 23 (1940);
"The Syllabus.Is the Law", 47 W. VA. L.Q. 141 (1941); "The Syllabus Is the
Law"-Another Word, 47 WV. VA. L.Q. 209 (1941); "The Syllabus Is the Law"
-Another Word by Fox. J., 48 W. VA. L.Q. 55 (1941).
5 "As that was not the basis of the decision... the language was dictum."
Wheeler v. Wilkin, 98 Colo. 568, 573, 58 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1936). 'Dictum,
however, in legal parlance is a statement of law in a court's opinion which
is not necessary to the decision of the matter in controversy." Putnam v. City
of Salina, 137 Kan. 731, 732, 22 P.2d 957 (1933). "We feel bound by things
said in our opinions, not because we said them, but because we had to say
them to reach the conclusion to which we came." Superior Oil Corp. v. Alcorn,
242 Ky. 814, 835, 47 S.W.2d 973, 984 (1931).
o 63 W. Va. 182, 59 SE. 971 (1907).
7 Id. at 185, 59 S.E. at 973.
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a God and rewards or punishment after death. The court went
into detail to point out that a witness is not now rendered in-
competent to testify in West Virginia by his religious belief, or
lack thereof. Here the court, at least indirectly, indicated its
acceptance of the rule that not only must the dying declaration be
such as would be admissible if the party were living, but that
the party must be one who would be competent to testify if he
were living.
In State v. Graham8 a dying declaration was admitted by the
trial court. This was declared error by the appellate court on
the ground that dying declarations must be confined to the facts
and circumstances relating to the homicide and forming part of
the res gestae.9 In so holding the court disapproved of a portion
of the syllabus in the Burnett case,10 and said it was not and never
had been the law in this state.1" That syllabus had set forth
two general propositions: (1) that the declaration must contain
such statements as would be admissible had the declarant been
sworn as a witness; and (2) if the statements relate to such facts
they are admissible. It was the latter statement to which the court
objected in the instant case in that it does not restrict the state-
ments to the circumstances surrounding the homicide. The court
makes no objection to the first proposition. In fact the court
remarked as to the dying declaration here involved: "It cannot
be received for any purpose as it clearly violated the rule that
it must relate to facts and circumstances forming part of the res
gestae. Other reasons might properly be urged against its admis-
sion, but these are sufficient."12 While the court does not list
these other reasons, it is at least arguable that the court was
referring to the objection of defendant's counsel that the declara-
tion contained opinions of the declarant.
8 94 W. Va. 67, 117 S.E. 699 (1923).
9 Another instance of the use of the overworked term "res gestae". Evidently
in such situations in West Virginia this term is used to mean the pertinent.
events leading up to and surrounding the homicide.
10 The sentence disapproved reads: "If they relate to facts to which the
declarant could have thus testified, they are admissible."
11 94 W. Va. at 71, 117 S.E. at 701. If, as the court states, this state-
ment was not the law at the time it was written, it must necessarily have
been a dictum thereby rendering this case fairly substantial authority for
the proposition that a syllabus may amount to nothing more than a dictum.
12 94 W. Va. at 72, 117 S.E. at 701. Italics supplied.
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In State v. Shelton13 the court excluded part of a declaration
a portion of which contained an opinion.14  Yet in justifying this
exclusion the court made no reference to the opinion rule, but
based its action on the ground that the statements bore no rele-
vance to the issue and were not part of the res gestae.
In State v. McLane'5 the court citing the Burnett case stated:
"The scope of a dying declaration should be confined to what, if
otherwise offered, would be admissible testimony."'16 However,
the statement here excluded was not opinion, but merely irrele-
vant and could have been excluded without laying down any such
broad principle as this.
From an analysis of the foregoing cases the situation in West
Virginia would seem to be as follows. The earliest case in point
1 7
lays down the broad proposition that opinions, which would not
have been admitted had the declarant been on the witness stand,
are inadmissible in dying declarations. While there is some author-
ity to support a contrary view,'. it would seem that the more
realistic approach to the rule laid down under the circumstances
here involved would be to treat it as a dictum, rather than as a
holding. This dictum is cited with approval in two later cases, 19
and in a third case20 is seemingly given implied approval by over-
ruling a portion of the syllabus containing this dictum, but leaving
the portion here dealt with unscathed. However, in neither of
the cases which approve the rule is the dictum advanced to the
status of a square holding. In both cases the proposition lifted
from the Burnett case and approved was broader than the question
before the court warranted.21  Moreover, the Shelton case
13 116 W. Va. 75, 178 S.E. 633 (1935).
14 Excluded portion reads: "I had had Buren Stephenson's gun, but gave
it to him about two hours before I was shot. I knew Bill was on parole
from the Federal Prison and that if I arrested him he would probably be
taken back to finish his sentence. Bill Shelton had been in Luke Rhode's
restaurant earlier in the evening. He seemed to be under the influence of
liquor and he had been arguing and cursing and was very noisy." Id. at 85,
178 S.E. at 637. Italics supplied to indicate opinion.
IS 126 W. Va. 219, 27 S.E.2d 604 (1943).
16 Id. at 224, 27 S.E.2d at 606.
17 State v. Burnett, 47 W. Va. 731, 35 S.E. 983 (1900).
is See Chance v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 298 N.Y. Supp. 17, 23
(Sup. Ct. 1937), where the court cites with approval Corpus Juris stating that
an expression, otherwise a dictum, becomes an authoritative statement when
the court expressly declares it to be announced as a guide for future conduct.
1 State v. Hood, 63 IV. Va. 182, 59 S.E. 971 (1907); State v. McLane, 126
W. Va. 219, 27 S.E.2d 604 (1943).
20 State v. Graham, 94 W. Va. 67, 117 S.E. 699 (1923).
21 In State v. Hood, 63 W. Va. 182, 59 S.E. 971 (1907), the issue was
whether hearsay statements included in a dying declaration were admissible;
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overlooked an excellent opportunity to apply such rule if it
actually constitutes part of the body of law of this state. In spite
of the view that an often repeated dictum may acquire the force
of a rule of law,22 this does not seem to have been repeated
frequently enough to bring it within the operation of such
principle. Thus as far as an actual holding is concerned, this
question remains unsettled in West Virginia. However, con-
sidering the law to be a prophecy of what the court will do in
the future, based upon what it has done and said in the past in
cases considering the same question, and the general judicial
trend evidenced in the decisions of the court, it is submitted that
the law in West Virginia is that the opinion rule is applicable
to dying declarations. The court has purported to apply this
rule to dying declarations; 23 moreover, so far as a fairly diligent
search has revealed the court has never admitted a dying declara-
tion which contained an opinion-with or without a discussion
of this problem.
Once having assumed the position that the opinion rule does
apply to dying declarations, it might be well to inquire as to the
importance and consequence of this result. It is submitted that
in most cases where an opinion is offered in a dying declaration,
such portion of the declaration can be excluded by the application
of either of two other entirely distinct evidentiary rules-the
requirement of personal observation on the part of the witness, 24
or the confining of the declaration to the circumstances immediately
surrounding the homicide- 2 5without reference to the opinion
rule. In those few cases where both the foregoing rules are
satisfied need the application of the opinion rule necessarily
exclude the opinion? It does not appear that such result inevitably
follows. As pointed out by Professor Wigmore,20 the main reason
for excluding an opinion is that it is superfluous, which reason
in State v. McLane, 126 W. Va. 219, 27 S.E.2d 604 (1943), the evidence rejected
was irrelevant.
22 United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 33 F.2d 533 (8th
Cir. 1929), afrd, 280 U.S. 478 (1930).
23 State v. Burnett, 47 W. Va. 731, 738, 35 S.E. 983, 985 (1900).
24 As to the requirement of personal observation, see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 478, 658. In some cases where the court speaks of opinion it is actually
dealing with statements not based on personal observation. See, e.g., State v.
Burnett, 47 W. Va. 731, 35 S.E. 983 (1900); Jones v. State, 52 Ark. 347, 12
S.W. 704 (1889). Nevertheless, the courts seem to overlook the distinction
between these two situations.
25 State v. Graham, 94 W. Va. 67, 117 S.E. 699 (1923).
26 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1447.
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in most cases would not apply to a dying declaration. Opinions
of a lay witness are not per se excluded. The test is whether
the witness can so reproduce or describe to the jury the facts upon
which the opinion is based that the jury is as capable of drawing
a conclusion therefrom as the witness.2 7  It is recognized that if a
witness cannot so describe the facts his opinion is admissible.
Why then, if the declarant-now deceased-has stated his opinion
without detailing facts, is not this opinion fully as competent to
go to the jury as in the case where the witness merely lacks an
adequate vocabulary or affluence sufficient to enable him to picture
verbally the facts to the jury?28  Surely the facts are just as
incapable of presentation. The same reasons for trustworthiness
apply to the declarant's opinion as to his narration of facts, and
the jury can determine the weight to be accorded to the opinion
as well as to the remainder of the declaration. It is submitted that
a logical and common-sense29 application of the opinion rule to
dying declarations should not exclude the opinion except in those
instances where the declarant has also related the facts upon
which his opinion is based and thereby rendered the opinion
superfluous.
J. H. M., Jr.
27 Taylor v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 33 W. Va. 39, 10 S.E. 29 (1889);
State v. Welch, 36 W. Va. 690, 15 S.E. 419 (1892); State v. Sixo, 77 W. Va. 243,
87 S.E. 267 (1915); 7 WGMRE, EVMENCE § 1924.
28 The writer does not mean to indicate that the test in every case depends
upon the individual's ability to describe the facts to the jury. Rather it would
seem to depend upon whether the fact to be described is one that an ordinary
person would have difficulty in describing in words or in visualizing if he
were listening to the description. See authorities cited in note 27 supra.
9 "The rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic and
common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive
law." Per Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Donnelly v. United States, 228
U.S. 243, 277 (1913).
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [1951], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol53/iss3/6
